Timothy Epstein, an associate at O'Hagan, Smith & Amundsen in Chicago, recently published an excellent law review article entitled "Splinters from the Bench: Feasibility of Lawsuits by Athletes Against Coaches and Schools for Lack of Playing Time." The article appears in Volume 4 of the Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal (2005). It discusses the feasibility of lawsuits brought by athletes against their coaches and schools for lack of playing time--a timely topic in light of NCAA v. Yeo, No. 03-0753, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 606 (August 26, 2005).
Yeo features a superstar college swimmer that ran afoul of the NCAA and it's myriad, and often confounding set of eligibility rules. Specifically, Joscelin Yeo, a native of Singapore, first attended University of California at Berkeley, but then transferred to the University of Texas in 2000 after her UC Berkeley coach took a job there. Pursuant to NCAA rules, UC Berkeley disallowed Yeo from swimming for UT for one year following her transfer (UC Berkeley could have, but didn't, sign a waiver exempting Yeo from that rule). As a result, UT deemed Yeo ineligible to swim for its team; otherwise, it risked sanction from the NCAA. Yeo then did not enroll in UT classes for the fall semester of 2000, instead competing for the Singapore Olympic team. She then enrolled in classes for the spring semester of 2001, and when fall 2001 semester started, Yeo and UT assumed that she had satisfied the one-year wait, and she started swimming for UT. They were wrong: because Yeo did not enroll in classes in the fall, that semester did not count toward her one year wait. The NCAA then ruled that she was ineligible to swim for the rest of the spring + the number of events she partook in the spring. But then it gets worse: UT tried to get around the added penalty by simply adding early events in the spring 2002 season. Berkeley complained, and, with sanctions looming, UT again deemed Yeo ineligible.
Understandably frustrated with the whole process, Yeo then sued the NCAA, claiming that UT never provided her notice of a hearing or a hearing in its decision. She won her trial, with the court granting a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction, thus allowing her to compete. The NCAA appealed, and lost, with the appellate court finding that (1) Yeo had already established an outstanding athletic reputation not only in her native Singapore, but throughout the world; (2) if NCAA rules did not forbid it, said fame would allow her to immediately reap the benefits of marketing and endorsement monies, while her athletic abilities would allow her professional compensation as a member of Singapore's national team; and (3) UT represented to Yeo that if she were to transfer to Berkeley, UT would not endanger Yeo's NCAA eligibility. Based on these facts, the appellate court ruled that Yeo had established an athletic reputation prior to attending Berkeley and competing under NCAA regulations, which was "a protected interest for purposes of due course of law." The appellate court did acknowledge that the due process protection that Yeo should have received was fact-specific, though, "depending on that athlete's specific situation and reputation." In other words, exceptional athletes like Yeo enjoy greater protection than other, not as noteworthy competitors.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, though, affirming the principle laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-571 (1972), that due process protection is afforded to something based on its nature, not its weight. NCAA v. Yeo, No. 03-0753, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 606 (August 26, 2005). As such, the court found that, "the nature of one's interest in a good reputation is the same no matter how good the reputation is."
The court did not stop there, though. Following the determination that Yeo's reputation enjoyed no greater due process protection than anyone else's, the court found Yeo's financial damages to be too speculative. "While student-athletes remain amateurs, their future financial opportunities remain expectations." Further, the court refused to equate the interest in intercollegiate athletic participation to that in graduate education.
The court then concluded with a chilling warning to potential claimants in disappointment lawsuits:
Yeo features a superstar college swimmer that ran afoul of the NCAA and it's myriad, and often confounding set of eligibility rules. Specifically, Joscelin Yeo, a native of Singapore, first attended University of California at Berkeley, but then transferred to the University of Texas in 2000 after her UC Berkeley coach took a job there. Pursuant to NCAA rules, UC Berkeley disallowed Yeo from swimming for UT for one year following her transfer (UC Berkeley could have, but didn't, sign a waiver exempting Yeo from that rule). As a result, UT deemed Yeo ineligible to swim for its team; otherwise, it risked sanction from the NCAA. Yeo then did not enroll in UT classes for the fall semester of 2000, instead competing for the Singapore Olympic team. She then enrolled in classes for the spring semester of 2001, and when fall 2001 semester started, Yeo and UT assumed that she had satisfied the one-year wait, and she started swimming for UT. They were wrong: because Yeo did not enroll in classes in the fall, that semester did not count toward her one year wait. The NCAA then ruled that she was ineligible to swim for the rest of the spring + the number of events she partook in the spring. But then it gets worse: UT tried to get around the added penalty by simply adding early events in the spring 2002 season. Berkeley complained, and, with sanctions looming, UT again deemed Yeo ineligible.
Understandably frustrated with the whole process, Yeo then sued the NCAA, claiming that UT never provided her notice of a hearing or a hearing in its decision. She won her trial, with the court granting a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction, thus allowing her to compete. The NCAA appealed, and lost, with the appellate court finding that (1) Yeo had already established an outstanding athletic reputation not only in her native Singapore, but throughout the world; (2) if NCAA rules did not forbid it, said fame would allow her to immediately reap the benefits of marketing and endorsement monies, while her athletic abilities would allow her professional compensation as a member of Singapore's national team; and (3) UT represented to Yeo that if she were to transfer to Berkeley, UT would not endanger Yeo's NCAA eligibility. Based on these facts, the appellate court ruled that Yeo had established an athletic reputation prior to attending Berkeley and competing under NCAA regulations, which was "a protected interest for purposes of due course of law." The appellate court did acknowledge that the due process protection that Yeo should have received was fact-specific, though, "depending on that athlete's specific situation and reputation." In other words, exceptional athletes like Yeo enjoy greater protection than other, not as noteworthy competitors.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, though, affirming the principle laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-571 (1972), that due process protection is afforded to something based on its nature, not its weight. NCAA v. Yeo, No. 03-0753, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 606 (August 26, 2005). As such, the court found that, "the nature of one's interest in a good reputation is the same no matter how good the reputation is."
The court did not stop there, though. Following the determination that Yeo's reputation enjoyed no greater due process protection than anyone else's, the court found Yeo's financial damages to be too speculative. "While student-athletes remain amateurs, their future financial opportunities remain expectations." Further, the court refused to equate the interest in intercollegiate athletic participation to that in graduate education.
The court then concluded with a chilling warning to potential claimants in disappointment lawsuits:
We have twice reminded the lower courts that 'judicial intervention in [student athletic disputes] often does more harm than good.' As the Fifth Circuit has said, judges are not 'super referees'. Along the same vein, the United States Supreme Court has observed: 'Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.' We reiterate this counsel to the trial courts and courts of appeals.According to Epstein, while this decision strikes a blow to potential "disappointment" plaintiffs, the tremendous "compensation" available to athletes in the form of scholarships, salary, and product endorsement, coupled with the growing amount and sophistication of athletic ability ratings systems and services, suggest these types of lawsuits will likely continue to be filed. For further analysis of this topic see Epstein's article in the latest issue of the Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal (4 VA. Sports & Ent. L.J. 174).
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