Sunday, August 5, 2007

Random Thoughts on Various Subjects

1. THE BOURNE ULTIMATUM

Too much steadicam for me.

2. THE FALLEN BRIDGE

If you wonder why bridges that are needed are crumbling while we get new bridges built in Buttfuck, Alaska, I have one word for you--EARMARKS.

3. TIME MANAGEMENT

I am failing in a big way on this one. My best tips are these--check email twice a day and turn off your phone and IM.

4. GETTING IN SHAPE

I'm taking up running again. I used to do it when I lived in Florida, and it felt great. Lost a lot of weight and had a lot of stamina. The only problem is that running cuts into social time a great deal. I used to feel the strain of being with people and the need to get in a few miles. I think that's why they call it the loneliness of the long distance runner.

I like running because it is cheap and convenient and devoid of the narcissism you find in the gym. Plus, it gives me time to think. I'm going to be selfish on this shit and do it everyday.

5. TONY STEWART

I am one of the fans who take the bullshit from everybody else, but it makes me happy as hell when Tony wins. I don't see how people can pull for Gordon or Junior. But that's just me. I hope Tony keeps racing for at least another ten years.

Saturday, August 4, 2007

Criticize the Coach At Your Own Risk or What Norman Dale Can Teach Us About the First Amendment

Last week, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Lowery v. Euverard. The court rejected constitutional claims brought by four former Tennessee high school football players against the school's coach and other school officials.

The players claimed their First Amendment rights were violated when they were dismissed from the team after circulating and signing a player petition declaring that they "hate[d]" Coach Euverard and did not want to play for him. The players were upset with several of Euverard' actions, including striking a player in the helmet, throwing away college recruiting letters addressed to disfavored players, using inappropriate language, and humiliating and degrading his players. The petition was supposed to be held until after the season, presumably to be submitted to the administration. But the coach found out about it, called the entire team into the locker room, and met individually with players to ask if they had signed the petition and who had started it circulating. The four players were kicked off the team when they refused to apologize for their expression; players who apologized were not kicked off the team.

The two-judge majority held that the players' speech in circulating the petition was not protected under the controlling rule of Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. (which provides that school officials can restrict student speech that is reasonably likely to materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school), thus there was no First Amendment violation in their dismissal. Under Tinker, . The third judge concurred in the judgment, finding that their was a constitutional violation, but that the coach and others were entitled to qualified immunity. There is some good discussion and commentary on the decision over at The Volokh Conspiracy.

Several things are notable about the majority opinion:

1) It is a very sport-centric decision. The court repeatedly talks about the need for athletic coaches (seemingly unique from other authority figures at the school) to lead their teams by maintaining order and discipline. Any speech that attacks or challenges the coach's authority undermines his ability to lead and the ability of the team to succeed on the field. All such critical speech thus becomes "disruptive." Similarly, there are several pages devoted to discussions of team unity and mutual respect between players and coaches and the necessity of unity and respect to success in sports (with citations to stories about the 2006 Detroit Tigers and the Florida Gators). Again, any such statements of dissatisfaction with the coach necessarily threaten that unity and thus are disruptive. Criticism of the coach risks dividing the team into camps--and such division makes it impossible for the team to succeed.

2) There is a suggestion that players who do not want to play for a particular coach have a "powerful incentive to give less than one hundred percent." The court quickly disavows any suggestion that this happened here, but it suggests that the possibility of such tanking, or the mere suspicion of it, would increase tension within the team.

3) The court begins the opinion by quoting a scene early in Hoosiers (link), where two players talk back to Coach Norman Dale during the first practice and Dale kicks both out of practice. One player later apologizes and is allowed back on the team. A coach must, the court argues, be able to discipline players who give him "lip" in this way.

4) The court spent a lot of time emphasizing the voluntary nature of participation in sports, pointing out that the students were not (and presumably could not be) suspended from school or denied an education; they only were prevented from participating in a voluntary extra-curricular. In other words, no one stopped them from speaking out or expressing their opinions, only from playing football, something they have no constitutional right to do.

5) In an interesting move, the court cited Connick v. Myers, the leading Supreme Court precedent on employee speech, and analogized the school's ability to restrict student speech that undermines authority and the good functioning of voluntary school activities to the government's ability to restrict employee speech that undermines authority and good functioning of public offices. Both deal, the court said, with "the ability of the government to set restrictions on voluntary programs it administers." What is not clear is whether the court was imposing a "public concern" requirement (a cornerstone of employee-speech doctrine) onto the student-speech doctrine.

6) The court had to work very hard to distinguish decisions from other federal circuits that denied summary judgment for the defendants on First Amendment challenges by high-school athletes against their coaches. The court drew a distinction between "whistle-blowers"--student-athletes who spoke out about wrongdoing within the team, such as hazing incidents--and players simply challenging their coach simply because they "hate" him.

I think this is a pretty bad decision. Not so much because the court rejected the free-speech claims--that is the expected outcome in all student-speech cases nowadays. But I think the majority's reasoning is shaky. And, while the court clearly was trying to cabin the reach and impact of the decision, I am not sure it did so.

Some thoughts:

1) Sports are not different from other extra-curricular activities because all are voluntary. And the success of any such activities similarly depends on those in authority maintaining order and discipline, maintaining unity of purpose among members of the organization, and not having the group divided into competing "camps." So there is no analytical difference between a sports team and, say, the school newspaper (similarly voluntary and extra-curricular). The result should be the same when a football player seeking to have his coach removed because he does not want to play for him and the student editor of the school newspaper petitioning to have the paper's faculty adviser removed because he was doing a bad job of running the paper and the students did not like working with him.

2) The court draws a line between whistle-blowing players (whose statements are protected) from players giving a coach "some lip" in a face-to-face encounter (not protected). This case involves something between those poles--the players were trying to take steps to draw the administration's attention to the players' dissatisfaction with Coach Euverard's coaching and his treatment of them. This is more than the players giving the coach lip. is, in some sense, whistle-blowing: Who better than the players to bring to the administration's attention that the coach is doing a bad job and has "lost" the players because of his misconduct?

3) As long as we are trafficking in clips from Hoosiers to support legal analysis, I suggest that the chose the inappropriate scene--involving a player giving Coach Dale "some lip"--to illuminate this case. A better scene comes later in the movie, when Jimmy Chitwood, the team's star who was taking time off from basketball, walks into the town meeting at which the people have voted to remove Dale as coach. Chitwood announces that he is ready to start playing again, on one condition: "I play, Coach stays. He goes, I go." The town leaders immediately call for a new vote, in which Dale is overwhelmingly retained. In other words, Chitwood spoke out on the matter of who should coach--exactly what the plaintiffs here did. The difference is, it worked for Chitwood simply because the powers-that-be agreed with what Chitwood wanted.

But the protection accorded to speech cannot depend on whether the speaker's argument carries the day. That is, it cannot be that a player is safe to criticize the coach if he can get the administration to back him, but he is subject to punishment if his arguments fail because the administration chooses to back the coach. The majority at one point states that this is what happened here. But that is a disturbing line.

4) Now, consider two counter-factuals off the Chitwood scene:

a) The town leaders stand by their dismissal of Dale, Chitwood decides to play anyway, and the new coach kicks him off the team because of his statement of support for Dale--which indirectly, could be said to undermine the new coach's authority and causes division within the team).
b) Chitwood comes into the meeting and tells the People to sack Dale as coach. But Dale is retained. He then kicks Chitwood off the team for urging his dismissal--which directly undermined his authority and caused division within the team.

In both of these situations, Chitwood clearly is being punished for his speech. But under Lowery, he has not First Amendment right to make those statements, at least if he wants to play high-school basketball at the only place he is permitted to play it.

5) The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is largely dead. The ethos of the decision is that government can condition participation in voluntary activities on a waiver of constitutional rights.

At some level, rejecting such First Amendment claims is understandable as a policy matter. A coach must be able to decide, with pretty free discretion, who will be on the team and who will play where and when. And there perhaps is a risk that every player cut from a team or who is not playing will attempt to argue that the coach's decision was retaliation for the player's expression.

But there must be a way to avoid that slippery slope without eliminating any First Amendment protection for those who participate in "voluntary" scholastic activities (which, given the competitiveness of college admissions these days, are not truly "voluntary" anymore). Or without completely abandoning the idea that high-school students not only do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," they also do not shed them at the door of the locker room.

Friday, August 3, 2007

Roy Tarpley, Addiction, and the American with Disabilities Act

Roy Tarpley is among the best basketball players who never starred in the NBA. After a stellar career at the University of Michigan, Tarpley, a 7'0 power forward, was selected 7th overall by the Dallas Mavericks in the infamous 1986 NBA Draft, a draft that saw the late Lenny Bias drafted second by the Boston Celtics and Chris Washburn--who Sports Illustrated recently named the second worst draft bust in NBA history--taken third by the Golden State Warriors.

Tarpley initially seemed like a star in the making. He made the NBA's all-rookie team, and, in his sophomore season (1987-88), won the NBA's 6th Man of the Year Award, averaging 14 points and 12 rebounds a game, while playing in almost every game for a team that won 53 games and made it to the Western Conference finals. During this time, however, Tarpley sought out counseling and treatment for a worsening addiction to cocaine and alcohol.

Unfortunately, neither the counseling nor treatment worked. In fact, Tarpley's third season proved to be the beginning of his career's end. He started to suffer a series of knee injuries, which hampered his play and caused him to miss games. The time off wasn't a blessing, as he more heavily dabbled in cocaine and other drugs, and also began consuming more alcohol. He then proceeded to fail mandatory drug tests and the NBA suspended him indefinitely on January 5, 1989. The NBA would allow him back for the 89-90 season, but six games into that season, Tarpley was arrested for driving while intoxicated and resisting arrest. The 1990-91 season didn't fare much better for Tarpley, who blew out his knee five games into the season, causing him to miss the rest of the season. Still sidelined with a knee injury in March of 1991, Tarpley was arrested again for driving while intoxicated, and the NBA suspended him for it.

Tarpley didn't play in the 1991-92 season because, after failing his third drug test, the NBA banned him for life under the league's collectively-bargained anti-drug program. Tarpley would then play in Greece for a couple of years. He enjoyed success over there, leading his team, Aris BC Salonica, to a championship (the European Cup) in 1993.

But Tarpley wanted to return to the U.S., where his family lived, and get back in the NBA. So in 1994, Tarpley applied for reinstatement to the NBA, and the league granted it. The then 29-year-old signed a 6-year contract with the Mavericks for $20 million, and played well for 55 games in the 94-95 season, averaging 13 points and 8 rebounds a game, but he then failed another drug test--for using alcohol and violating the terms of a court-imposed personal after-care program. With the third strike, the NBA kicked him out for good, thus negating the remainder of his $20 million contract.

Tarpley then returned to Greece, where he would play for the next few years. In 2000, however, he came back to the U.S. and, for unclear reasons, did not work. By 2003, Tarpley was completely broke, and he applied for reinstatement to the NBA. His financial woes primarily stemmed from two civil judgments entered against him in 2000 totaling about $8.5 million -- as reported by a Dallas Business Journal article in 2003, "both judgments stemmed from the 1997 death of a Good Samaritan who tried to help a girlfriend of Tarpley's who was behind the wheel of a car he owned that flipped over on a freeway." At that time, things looked really bleak for Tarpley:
The man who in 1994 signed a reported six-year, $20 million contract with the Mavericks said in his bankruptcy petition that he did not have any cash on hand, checking or savings accounts, household goods, investments or cars.

Tarpley could not be reached for comment. But in a June 13 creditors meeting in the case, he said he has been unemployed for four years, and that he was staying with an unnamed friend in Arlington.

Tarpley indicated this person, or persons, had fed and otherwise provided for him, as he does not have any income. His bankrutpcy attorney, Stanley Burch, says Tarpley has a "wonderful girlfriend" who has provided him with a $10 weekly allowance to "take care of his situation."

"Her family cares for him deeply," says Burch, who practices in Dallas.

Tarpley has at least $8,596 in credit card bills, $36,348 in federal tax liabilities dating to 1994 and a California state tax bill of $13,324 from 1995, filings show. Much of his fortune was wiped out in a divorce case about eight years ago.

Although John Lucas fought hard for Tarpley's reinstatement, noting that Tarpley had remained in good physical condition and had repeatedly passed drug tests (including those for alcohol, the substance which led to Tarpley being banned in 1995), the NBA rejected the petition. Tarpley tried several more petitions, but the NBA kept saying no. Still wanting to play pro hoops, Tarpley signed with the Michigan Mayhem of the Continental Basketball Association, where he would play from 2003 to 2006. Although often injured, he excelled in his first season, averaging 16 points and 10 rebounds a game, while shooting almost 60% from the field. But he would be out of job in 2006, when his team disbanded. Tarpley was 41 at the time.

Should the NBA have reinstated Tarpley in 2003, when Tarpley had shown that he had been clean for years and was in good enough condition to land an NBA contract? Tarpley thinks so. And now so too does the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled today that the NBA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to reinstate him. The EEOC has tried unsuccessfully to mediate a settlement between Tarpley and the NBA, and he is seeking at least $6.5 million, according to his attorney Joe Walker, who said, "The goal of the whole action is to get him reinstated, get his name back, and also to compensate him for the loss he's incurred."

The ADA protects those with disabilities from discrimination, provided their disabilty is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity." Alcoholics and drug addicts (although not those engaged in current use of illegal drugs) are protected by the ADA, provided they are able to perform the essential functions of the job. The EEOC believed that Tarpley offered enough evidence that he could play in the NBA, since he showed that he no longer used drugs and apparently had his alcoholism under control.

I find the EEOC's decision--which enables Tarpley to sue the NBA within the next 90 days---interesting because it suggests that the NBA and other pro leagues have to be careful when banning players for life when the root of the problem is a medical one. Although alcoholics and drug addicts are often blamed for "choosing" to engage in destructive behavior, recent studies on how the brain works suggest such behavior is largely not reflective of conscious choosing (see an article we have up on The Situationist entitled "The Science of Addiction, the Myth of Choice"). That's not to say that Tarpley shouldn't be held responsible for the consequences of his addition (certainly, driving a car while intoxicated deserves punishment), or that he didn't deserve a punishment of a reasonable length of time, particularly after repeated failures, but it does suggest that when leagues kick out players for life, they need to be careful in evaluating the underlying causes of behavior and the potential that people can eventually get better, as Tarpley seemed to do.

Another interesting consequence: even though the NBA and NBPA collectively-bargained the anti-drug policy, that collective-bargaining wasn't enough to defend the policy from governmental scrutiny. Collective bargaining, of course, doesn't insulate an agreement from the law, but in practice, it usually discourages governmental scrutiny.

Major League Baseball Embraces StubHub



It used to be called ticket scalping. Now, it’s known as purchasing tickets from a secondary distributor.

Much like the evolution of Las Vegas from a gambling haven run in part by organized crime to a center of glitz and glamour, the ticket purchasing business has gone corporate and high-tech. Founded by two Stanford MBAs in 2000, StubHub became a lucrative venture that changed a culture. Gone are the shady characters who hawked tickets in front of venues, replaced by keystrokes, credit cards and eBay (which acquired StubHub earlier this year for a cool $310 million). Like Vegas, scalping has gone legit and StubHub has been at the forefront of the transformation.

I thought about this evolution while reading Major League Baseball’s announcement that it entered into a five-year revenue-sharing agreement with StubHub. The league, which until recently frowned on scalping, now will get revenue from every secondary ticket sale on the website. This could turn into a pretty penny, as the company charges a 25 percent markup on any ticket sold, in addition to whatever price the buyer wishes to pay. At this time, the amount that MLB will receive has not been reported.

Baseball joins a number of NFL, NHL and collegiate teams that have signed deals with the company. This agreement, with Major League Baseball Advanced Media, it's online division, is a coup for baseball, since about 75 million tickets are sold to Major League Baseball games, one third of which are bought online and an estimated $10 billion worth of baseball tickets are resold online and offline each year, according to Reuters.

The lack of standardization of resale laws among the states make utilization of the company a challenge in some locations. Thirty-eight states permit the reselling of event tickets, so long as the sale does not take place at the event site. The other 12 states have varying degrees of regulation, including registration requirements and maximum markups. The growing acceptance of StubHub and other such companies convinced New York to deregulate secondary ticket sales in June.

MLB’s embrace of StubHub comes less than a year after more than 100 Yankees’ season-tickets holders suspected of reselling their regular-season seats on StubHub received letters denying them the right to buy playoff tickets and barring them from buying season tickets for the following season. Others teams have discouraged the practice. As noted in a post by Chris Callanan, the New England Patriots sued StubHub and a season ticket holder for reselling tickets on line.

In a sense, StubHub combines capitalistic supply and demand and is another chapter in the growing fight for control for marketing and distribution between a sports league and its individual teams. The major leagues, especially Major League Baseball and the NHL, have drawn on new technologies to control on-line content, advertising and sales revenues from merchandised items. Control of secondary ticket sales poses problems for individual teams who have agreements with other secondary services, such as TicketMaster. One example is the litigation between the NBA’s Cleveland Cavaliers and TicketMaster. First, TicketMaster sued the team in a California federal district court, claiming that the team’s secondary service (named “Flash Seats”) violated the exclusivity clause of the agreement between the parties. At the end of July, the Cavs sued TicketMaster, alleging antitrust violations.
Those Stanford MBA students created an interesting case study for future classes to analyze.

Godspeed Bo ~ 1996-2007



It has taken me a couple of weeks to ad this post to my blog...

On Thursday 19th July my beautiful ISH mare Rockdon Bollee was discovered in her paddock, dead. She had slipped twins and then suffered an internal haemhorrage. My vet assures me that there is nothing we could have done - I however, will always ask myself the 'what if' questions. I try so hard to minimise all the risks when breeding my precious mares but still these things seem happen and I inevitably blame myself. I don't understand why this has happened but, it has.

Bo was a sweet gentle mare and was Hippy's best friend. Her friendly face will be sorely missed at Talisman Farm.
RIP Bo ...

Thursday, August 2, 2007

Legal Formalism and Tim Donaghy

Michael Dorf and I seem to share an interest in what sports rules and their enforcement can tell us about legal rules and their enforcement in society at large. Only Mike does it better, as a constitutional theorist of the highest order. His latest missive examines the differences among formalism, realism, and radical realism (critical legal studies) and how the Tim Donaghy scandal reveals defects with radical legal realism.

I want to take off on two points about legal formalism, based on an interesting piece in the new Sports Illustrated. Based on interviews with an anonymous retired NBA referee, the story suggests that Donaghy called fouls "by the book," meaning he called a lot of them--Donaghy-led crews twice ranked in the top-5 in fouls-called-per-game (apparently, there only are statistics on calls-per-crew, not calls-per-ref). Donaghy particularly called fouls on the bumping, grinding, and jockeying in the low post and away from the ball, where other refs often warn the players to keep it clean a few times before blowing the whistle. As the retired ref put it, "[T]here are ways to use common sense to tell players to knock stuff off. ­Instead, Donaghy would blow his whistle on all of it." The result is a lot more fouls, a lot more free throws (teams get into the bonus more quickly), and a lot more scoring in Donaghy-officiated games, making it more likely that the final score will exceed the over/under line (the story says that 60 % of Donaghy games hit the "over").

In other words, Donaghy was more of a legal formalist than other referees. He enforced the rules strictly as written, blowing the whistle on a large amount of contact. He often did so by focusing solely on what the text of the rulebook required, without regard to the spirit, intent, or purpose of the rules, which was to keep games moving and flowing and to allow players to play (a spirit that other refs might take into account by warning players about the jockeying first). Ironically, this legal formalism could have facilitated the misconduct of which Donaghy is accused. This style makes it both more likely that an official could influence games in this way (he is going to call a lot of fouls anyway, so it just takes it up a small notch) and more difficult to discover if he was trying to rig games (did he call a lot of fouls for illegitimate purposes or was he just calling his normal game?). More ironically, his formalism made Donaghy one of the better-regarded officials within NBA offices, even as players, coaches, and other refs disliked him and his style.

The article raises a second point that ties into legal rule making. The retired ref states that "one guy can really influence the flow of a game because other refs try to get on the same page, and suddenly everybody is calling everything."

Recent scholarship has examined differences in the way case are decided by single-member courts (trial court, where one judge decides everything) as opposed to multi-member courts (such as appellate and reviewing courts, where one judge must convince one and perhaps as many as four of her colleagues to decide anything). NBA officiating crews operate as a combination of the two. There are three members of the "court" but most decisions can be made by just one member. In theory, each member could call her own game and bend the game to her style. But the reality is that members instead read one another and try to call games consistently and uniformly with one another; this affords players and coaches maximum predictability as to how a game is going to go and allows them to play accordingly. So Donaghy's formalism potentially brings out similar formalism in his crew mates and makes the game as a whole a more formalist affair.

The analogy that comes to mind is individual judges within one federal judicial district, where each judge hears and decides her own cases as a single-member court. The decision of one judge is not binding precedent on any other judge on the court. But it is persuasive authority; judges often respect the interpretations and decisions of other judges on the court, partly in the name of uniformity, consistency, and predictability of the law within the district, allowing the public to better know what the law requires. Again, one formalist judge can influence other judges to be similarly formalist.

More nefariously: It is possible that Donaghy's officiating partners unwittingly and unknowingly facilitated his scheme by bringing their calls into line with his.

Wednesday, August 1, 2007

Troubling Implications in CA Court's Acceptance of Stadium Patdowns

The issue of pat-down searches at NFL stadiums has generated several excellent commentaries in this blog over the last two years. The comments by Greg and Michael on the Fourth Amendment challenges to these searches, notably involving a case from the 11th Circuit challenging the policy at the Tampa Bay Buccaneers' Raymond James Stadium, the home of the serve as a good background for those reading about the issue for the first time.

In the last few weeks, two rulings by different courts tested the policies once again. The first, Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, involved the 11th Circuit's ruling in Tampa Bay case, which was discussed in Howard's blog. The second, a California Appeals Court ruling on a challenge to the San Francisco 49ers pat-down policies involves different issues and produced a different kind of troubling opinion.

While the conclusions of the 11th Circuit and the California state courts were similar – the parties consented to be searched entering the stadiums -- they took very different approaches to reach their conclusions. While I can understand the need for some limited searches, the broad conclusions troubles me.

Let’s analyze the California case, Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, decided by the state's first appellate district on July 17. The patdown policy was instituted in 2005 at the behest of the NFL to prevent terrorist acts from taking place in its teams' stadium, considered "attractive targets" for terrorists. Two season ticket holders sued the 49ers for violation of the privacy rights outlined in Art. I, sec. 1 of the California state constitution, a broad mandate protecting individuals from nongovernmental entities intruding on an individual's privacy. The Sheehans alleged that the mandatory patdown search of all fans as a condition of entry for the team's home games during the 2005 season violated that provision.

Their efforts failed. In a 2-1 ruling, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal the claim outright, without leave to amend because they consented to the search, defeating any reasonable expectation of privacy.

According to state law, a plaintiff asserting a privacy claim must establish three essential elements: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) conduct on the part of the defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy. The plaintiffs failed in the second element because they had notice of the policy and by entering the game, they consented to it. In addition, the fact that they renewed their season tickets for the 2006 season was, according to the majority, an implied consent to accept the policy and defeats any reasonable expectation of privacy and upholds the discretion of the trial court in reject a leave to amend the complaint.

I find several issues problematic. The majority differentiates between actions challenging non-governmental agency searches with governmental searches. It states "the pervasive presence of coercive government power" more gravely imperils the freedom of citizens than action by the private sector.” Think of the implications of such a statement in an age of increasing information technology. Software exists for private companies to track every website, every keystroke and e-mail one makes. Then comes the question, more on point in this case, whether the “private sector” is a de facto monopoly and how that affects the above-mentioned privacy claim?

That was answered in the thoughtful dissent by Judge Rivera. He noted that the Sheehans sought an injunction during the prior season and could have argued (if they were allowed to amend their complaint) that as 40-year ticket holders, they did not want to lose their seniority while the case was litigation. He also crafted a more nuanced approach to the abandonment of reasonable expectation of privacy by consent. He questioned the idea that the mere acceptance of season tickets the following season, without more, is accepting the patdown policy. He rightly concluded that this is a question of fact to determine based on more information.

And, in the piece de resistance, the judge tears away the “consent.” He writes:
The majority’s conclusion “effectively relegates to free market forces the acceptable norms of privacy intrusions. In fact, the 49ers argued . . . that they have the right to impose any conditions of doing business and that consumer tolerance would sufficiently temper the more egregious invasions of privacy. In my view, the courts' role in protecting privacy rights should not be so readily abdicated, particularly where, as here, the private actor has an effective monopoly. If you are the only game in town, requiring your customers to either submit to a patdown search or walk away does not present the kind of genuine choice upon which the majority's reasoning is premised.
Can there really be knowing consent to a patdown search under these circumstances?